public_key(3)

NAME
public_key - API module for public-key infrastructure.

DESCRIPTION

Provides functions to handle public-key infrastructure, for details see public_key(6).

COMMON RECORDS AND ASN.1 TYPES

    Note:
All records used in this Reference Manual are generated from ASN.1 specifications and are documented in the User's Guide. See Public-key Records.

Use the following include directive to get access to the records and constant macros described here and in the User's Guide:

 -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl").

DATA TYPES
oid() = tuple()

    Object identifier, a tuple of integers as generated by the ASN.1 compiler.
key_oid_name() =
    rsaEncryption | 'id-RSASSA-PSS' | 'id-ecPublicKey' |
    'id-Ed25519' | 'id-Ed448' | 'id-dsa'

    Macro names for key object identifiers used by prefixing with ?
der_encoded() = binary()
pki_asn1_type() =
    'Certificate' | 'RSAPrivateKey' | 'RSAPublicKey' |
    'SubjectPublicKeyInfo' | 'DSAPrivateKey' | 'DHParameter' |
    'PrivateKeyInfo' | 'CertificationRequest' | 'ContentInfo' |
    'CertificateList' | 'ECPrivateKey' | 'OneAsymmetricKey' |
    'EcpkParameters'
asn1_type() = atom()

    ASN.1 type present in the Public Key applications ASN.1 specifications.
pem_entry() =
    {pki_asn1_type(),
     der_or_encrypted_der(),
     not_encrypted | cipher_info()}
der_or_encrypted_der() = binary()
cipher_info() = {cipher(), cipher_info_params()}
cipher() = string()
salt() = binary()
cipher_info_params() =
    salt() |
    {#'PBEParameter'{}, digest_type()} |
    #'PBES2-params'{}

    Cipher = "RC2-CBC" | "DES-CBC" | "DES-EDE3-CBC"

    Salt could be generated with crypto:strong_rand_bytes(8).
public_key() =
    rsa_public_key() |
    rsa_pss_public_key() |
    dsa_public_key() |
    ec_public_key() |
    ed_public_key()
rsa_public_key() = #'RSAPublicKey'{}
dss_public_key() = integer()
rsa_pss_public_key() =
    {rsa_pss_public_key(), #'RSASSA-PSS-params'{}}
dsa_public_key() = {dss_public_key(), #'Dss-Parms'{}}
ec_public_key() = {#'ECPoint'{}, ecpk_parameters_api()}
public_key_params() =
    'NULL' |
    #'RSASSA-PSS-params'{} |
    {namedCurve, oid()} |
    #'ECParameters'{} |
    #'Dss-Parms'{}
ecpk_parameters() =
    {ecParameters, #'ECParameters'{}} |
    {namedCurve, Oid :: tuple()}
ecpk_parameters_api() =
    ecpk_parameters() |
    #'ECParameters'{} |
    {namedCurve, Name :: crypto:ec_named_curve()}
public_key_info() =
    {key_oid_name(),
     rsa_public_key() | #'ECPoint'{} | dss_public_key(),
     public_key_params()}
ed_public_key() = {#'ECPoint'{}, ed_params()}
ed_params() = {namedCurve, ed_oid_name()}
private_key() =
    rsa_private_key() |
    rsa_pss_private_key() |
    dsa_private_key() |
    ec_private_key() |
    ed_private_key() |
    #{algorithm := eddsa | rsa_pss_pss | ecdsa | rsa | dsa,
      sign_fun => function()}
rsa_private_key() =
    #'RSAPrivateKey'{} |
    #{algorithm := rsa, encrypt_fun => function()}
rsa_pss_private_key() =
    {#'RSAPrivateKey'{}, #'RSASSA-PSS-params'{}}
dsa_private_key() = #'DSAPrivateKey'{}
ec_private_key() = #'ECPrivateKey'{}
ed_private_key() = #'ECPrivateKey'{parameters = ed_params()}
custom_key_opts() = [term()]

    Can be provided together with a custom private key, that specifies a key fun, to provide additional options understood by the fun.
ed_oid_name() = 'id-Ed25519' | 'id-Ed448'

    Macro names for object identifiers for EDDSA curves used by prefixing with ?
key_params() =
    #'DHParameter'{} |
    {namedCurve, oid()} |
    #'ECParameters'{} |
    {rsa, Size :: integer(), PubExp :: integer()}
digest_type() =
    none | sha1 |
    crypto:rsa_digest_type() |
    crypto:dss_digest_type() |
    crypto:ecdsa_digest_type()
issuer_name() = {rdnSequence, [[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{}]]}
referenceIDs() = [referenceID()]
referenceID() =
    {uri_id | dns_id | ip | srv_id | atom() | oid(), string()} |
    {ip, inet:ip_address() | string()}
cert_id() = {SerialNr :: integer(), issuer_name()}
cert() = der_cert() | otp_cert()
otp_cert() = #'OTPCertificate'{}
der_cert() = der_encoded()
combined_cert() =
    #cert{der = public_key:der_encoded(),
          otp = #'OTPCertificate'{}}
policy_node() =
    #{valid_policy := public_key:oid(),
      qualifier_set := [#'UserNotice'{} | {uri, string()}],
      expected_policy_set := [public_key:oid()]}
bad_cert_reason() =
    cert_expired | invalid_issuer | invalid_signature |
    name_not_permitted | missing_basic_constraint |
    invalid_key_usage | duplicate_cert_in_path |
    {policy_requirement_not_met, term()} |
    {invalid_policy_mapping, term()} |
    {revoked, crl_reason()} |
    invalid_validity_dates |
    {revocation_status_undetermined, term()} |
    atom()
crl_reason() =
    unspecified | keyCompromise | cACompromise |
    affiliationChanged | superseded | cessationOfOperation |
    certificateHold | privilegeWithdrawn | aACompromise
chain_opts() =
    #{chain_end() := [cert_opt()],
      intermediates => [[cert_opt()]]}
chain_end() = root | peer
cert_opt() =
    {digest, public_key:digest_type()} |
    {key, public_key:key_params() | public_key:private_key()} |
    {validity,
     {From :: erlang:timestamp(), To :: erlang:timestamp()}} |
    {extensions, [#'Extension'{}]}
test_root_cert() =
    #{cert := der_encoded(), key := public_key:private_key()}
test_config() =
    #{server_config := [conf_opt()],
      client_config := [conf_opt()]}
conf_opt() =
    {cert, public_key:der_encoded()} |
    {key, public_key:private_key()} |
    {cacerts, [public_key:der_encoded()]}

EXPORTS

cacerts_clear() -> boolean()

    Clears any loaded CA certificates, returns true if any was loaded.

cacerts_get() -> [combined_cert()]

    Returns the trusted CA certificates if any are loaded, otherwise uses cacerts_load/0 to load them. The function fails if no cacerts could be loaded.

cacerts_load() -> ok | {error, Reason :: term()}

    Loads the OS supplied trusted CA certificates.

cacerts_load(File :: file:filename_all()) ->
                ok | {error, Reason :: term()}

    Loads the trusted CA certificates from a file.

compute_key(OthersECDHkey, MyECDHkey) -> SharedSecret

    Types:
        OthersECDHkey = #'ECPoint'{}
        MyECDHkey = #'ECPrivateKey'{}
        SharedSecret = binary()

    Computes shared secret.

compute_key(OthersDHkey, MyDHkey, DHparms) -> SharedSecret

    Types:
        OthersDHkey = crypto:dh_public()
        MyDHkey = crypto:dh_private()
        DHparms = #'DHParameter'{}
        SharedSecret = binary()

    Computes shared secret.

decrypt_private(CipherText, Key) -> PlainText
decrypt_private(CipherText, Key, Options) -> PlainText

    Types:
        CipherText = binary()
        Key = rsa_private_key()
        Options = crypto:pk_encrypt_decrypt_opts()
        PlainText = binary()

    Public-key decryption using the private key. See also crypto:private_decrypt/4

decrypt_public(CipherText, Key) -> PlainText
decrypt_public(CipherText, Key, Options) -> PlainText

    Types:
        CipherText = binary()
        Key = rsa_public_key()
        Options = crypto:pk_encrypt_decrypt_opts()
        PlainText = binary()

    Public-key decryption using the public key. See also crypto:public_decrypt/4

der_decode(Asn1Type, Der) -> Entity

    Types:
        Asn1Type = asn1_type()
        Der = der_encoded()
        Entity = term()

    Decodes a public-key ASN.1 DER encoded entity.

der_encode(Asn1Type, Entity) -> Der

    Types:
        Asn1Type = asn1_type()
        Entity = term()
        Der = binary()

    Encodes a public-key entity with ASN.1 DER encoding.

dh_gex_group(MinSize, SuggestedSize, MaxSize, Groups) ->
                {ok, {Size, Group}} | {error, term()}

    Types:
        MinSize = SuggestedSize = MaxSize = integer() >= 1
        Groups = undefined | [{Size, [Group]}]
        Size = integer() >= 1
        Group = {G, P}
        G = P = integer() >= 1

    Selects a group for Diffie-Hellman key exchange with the key size in the range MinSize...MaxSize and as close to SuggestedSize as possible. If Groups == undefined a default set will be used, otherwise the group is selected from Groups.

    First a size, as close as possible to SuggestedSize, is selected. Then one group with that key size is randomly selected from the specified set of groups. If no size within the limits of MinSize and MaxSize is available, {error,no_group_found} is returned.

    The default set of groups is listed in lib/public_key/priv/moduli. This file may be regenerated like this:

    	$> cd $ERL_TOP/lib/public_key/priv/
    	$> generate
             ---- wait until all background jobs has finished. It may take several days !
    	$> cat moduli-* > moduli
    	$> cd ..; make

encrypt_private(PlainText, Key) -> CipherText
encrypt_private(PlainText, Key, Options) -> CipherText

    Types:
        PlainText = binary()
        Key = rsa_private_key()
        Options = crypto:pk_encrypt_decrypt_opts() | custom_key_opts()
        CipherText = binary()

    Public-key encryption using the private key. See also crypto:private_encrypt/4. The key, can besides a standard RSA key, be a map specifing the key algorithm rsa and a fun to handle the encryption operation. This may be used for customized the encryption operation with for instance hardware security modules (HSM) or trusted platform modules (TPM).

encrypt_public(PlainText, Key) -> CipherText
encrypt_public(PlainText, Key, Options) -> CipherText

    Types:
        PlainText = binary()
        Key = rsa_public_key()
        Options = crypto:pk_encrypt_decrypt_opts()
        CipherText = binary()

    Public-key encryption using the public key. See also crypto:public_encrypt/4.

generate_key(Params :: DHparams | ECparams | RSAparams) ->
                DHkeys | ECkey | RSAkey

    Types:
        DHparams = #'DHParameter'{}
        DHkeys = {PublicDH :: binary(), PrivateDH :: binary()}
        ECparams = ecpk_parameters_api()
        ECkey = #'ECPrivateKey'{}
        RSAparams = {rsa, Size, PubExp}
        Size = PubExp = integer() >= 1
        RSAkey = #'RSAPrivateKey'{}

    Generates a new key pair. Note that except for Diffie-Hellman the public key is included in the private key structure. See also crypto:generate_key/2

pem_decode(PemBin :: binary()) -> [pem_entry()]

    Decodes PEM binary data and returns entries as ASN.1 DER encoded entities.

    Example {ok, PemBin} = file:read_file("cert.pem"). PemEntries = public_key:pem_decode(PemBin).

pem_encode(PemEntries :: [pem_entry()]) -> binary()

    Creates a PEM binary.

pem_entry_decode(PemEntry) -> term()
pem_entry_decode(PemEntry, Password) -> term()

    Types:
        PemEntry = pem_entry()
        Password = iodata() | fun(() -> iodata())

    Decodes a PEM entry. pem_decode/1 returns a list of PEM entries. Notice that if the PEM entry is of type 'SubjectPublickeyInfo', it is further decoded to an rsa_public_key() or dsa_public_key().

    Password can be either an octet string or function which returns same type.

pem_entry_encode(Asn1Type, Entity) -> pem_entry()
pem_entry_encode(Asn1Type, Entity, InfoPwd) -> pem_entry()

    Types:
        Asn1Type = pki_asn1_type()
        Entity = term()
        InfoPwd = {CipherInfo, Password}
        CipherInfo = cipher_info()
        Password = iodata()

    Creates a PEM entry that can be feed to pem_encode/1.

    If Asn1Type is 'SubjectPublicKeyInfo', Entity must be either an rsa_public_key(), dsa_public_key() or an ec_public_key() and this function creates the appropriate 'SubjectPublicKeyInfo' entry.

pkix_decode_cert(Cert, Type) -> #'Certificate'{} | otp_cert()

    Types:
        Cert = der_cert()
        Type = plain | otp

    Decodes an ASN.1 DER-encoded PKIX certificate. Option otp uses the customized ASN.1 specification OTP-PKIX.asn1 for decoding and also recursively decode most of the standard parts.

pkix_encode(Asn1Type, Entity, Type) -> Der

    Types:
        Asn1Type = asn1_type()
        Entity = term()
        Type = otp | plain
        Der = der_encoded()

    DER encodes a PKIX x509 certificate or part of such a certificate. This function must be used for encoding certificates or parts of certificates that are decoded/created in the otp format, whereas for the plain format this function directly calls der_encode/2.

        Note:
    Subtle ASN-1 encoding errors in certificates may be worked around when decoding, this may have the affect that the encoding a certificate back to DER may generate different bytes then the supplied original.

pkix_is_issuer(CertorCRL, IssuerCert) -> boolean()

    Types:
        CertorCRL = cert() | #'CertificateList'{}
        IssuerCert = cert()

    Checks if IssuerCert issued Cert.

pkix_is_fixed_dh_cert(Cert) -> boolean()

    Types:
        Cert = cert()

    Checks if a certificate is a fixed Diffie-Hellman certificate.

pkix_is_self_signed(Cert) -> boolean()

    Types:
        Cert = cert()

    Checks if a certificate is self-signed.

pkix_issuer_id(Cert, IssuedBy) ->
                  {ok, ID :: cert_id()} | {error, Reason}

    Types:
        Cert = cert()
        IssuedBy = self | other
        Reason = term()

    Returns the x509 certificate issuer id, if it can be determined.

pkix_normalize_name(Issuer) -> Normalized

    Types:
        Issuer = issuer_name() | der_encoded()
        Normalized = issuer_name()

    Normalizes an issuer name so that it can be easily compared to another issuer name.

pkix_path_validation(Cert, CertChain, Options) ->
                        {ok,
                         {PublicKeyInfo, ConstrainedPolicyNodes}} |
                        {error,
                         {bad_cert, Reason :: bad_cert_reason()}}

    Types:
        Cert = cert() | atom()
        CertChain = [cert() | combined_cert()]
        Options =
            [{max_path_length, integer()} |
             {verify_fun, {function(), term()}}]
        PublicKeyInfo = public_key_info()
        ConstrainedPolicyNodes = [policy_node()]

    Performs a basic path validation according to RFC 5280. However, CRL validation is done separately by pkix_crls_validate/3 and is to be called from the supplied verify_fun. The policy tree check was added in OTP-26.2 and if the certificates include policies the constrained policy set with potential qualifiers will be returned, these values are derived from the policy tree created as part of the path validation algorithm. The constrained set can be constrained only by the Certificate Authorities or also by the user when the option policy_set is provided to this function. The qualifiers convey information about the valid policy and is intended as information to end users.

    Available options:

        {verify_fun, {fun(), InitialUserState::term()}:
            The fun must be defined as:

        fun(OtpCert :: #'OTPCertificate'{},
            Event :: {bad_cert, Reason :: atom() | {revoked, atom()}} |
                     {extension, #'Extension'{}},
            InitialUserState :: term()) ->
        	{valid, UserState :: term()} |
        	{valid_peer, UserState :: term()} |
        	{fail, Reason :: term()} |
        	{unknown, UserState :: term()}.

            If the verify callback fun returns {fail, Reason}, the verification process is immediately stopped. If the verify callback fun returns {valid, UserState}, the verification process is continued. This can be used to accept specific path validation errors, such as selfsigned_peer, as well as verifying application-specific extensions. If called with an extension unknown to the user application, the return value {unknown, UserState} is to be used.

            Warning:
        Note that user defined custom verify_fun may alter original path validation error (e.g selfsigned_peer). Use with caution.

        {max_path_length, integer()}:
             The max_path_length is the maximum number of non-self-issued intermediate certificates that can follow the peer certificate in a valid certification path. So, if max_path_length is 0, the PEER must be signed by the trusted ROOT-CA directly, if it is 1, the path can be PEER, CA, ROOT-CA, if it is 2, the path can be PEER, CA, CA, ROOT-CA, and so on.

        {policy_set, [oid()]}:
             The set of policies that will be accepted, defaults to the special value [?anyPolicy] that will accept all policies.

        {explicit_policy, boolean()}:
            Explicitly require that each certificate in the path must include at least one of the certificate policies in the policy_set.

        {inhibit_policy_mapping, boolean()}:
            Prevent policies to be mapped to other policies.

        {inhibit_any_policy, boolean()}:
            Prevent the special policy ?anyPolicy from being accepted.

    Explanations of reasons for a bad certificate:

        cert_expired:
            Certificate is no longer valid as its expiration date has passed.

        invalid_issuer:
            Certificate issuer name does not match the name of the issuer certificate in the chain.

        invalid_signature:
            Certificate was not signed by its issuer certificate in the chain.

        name_not_permitted:
            Invalid Subject Alternative Name extension.

        missing_basic_constraint:
            Certificate, required to have the basic constraints extension, does not have a basic constraints extension.

        invalid_key_usage:
            Certificate key is used in an invalid way according to the key-usage extension.

        {revoked, crl_reason()}:
            Certificate has been revoked.

        invalid_validity_dates:
            The validity section of the X.509 certificate(s) contains invalid date formats not matching the RFC.

        atom():
            Application-specific error reason that is to be checked by the verify_fun.

pkix_crl_issuer(CRL) -> Issuer

    Types:
        CRL = der_encoded() | #'CertificateList'{}
        Issuer = issuer_name()

    Returns the issuer of the CRL.

pkix_crls_validate(OTPcertificate, DPandCRLs, Options) ->
                      CRLstatus

    Types:
        OTPcertificate = #'OTPCertificate'{}
        DPandCRLs = [DPandCRL]
        DPandCRL = {DP, {DerCRL, CRL}}
        DP = #'DistributionPoint'{}
        DerCRL = der_encoded()
        CRL = #'CertificateList'{}
        Options = [{atom(), term()}]
        CRLstatus = valid | {bad_cert, BadCertReason}
        BadCertReason =
            revocation_status_undetermined |
            {revocation_status_undetermined, Reason :: term()} |
            {revoked, crl_reason()}

    Performs CRL validation. It is intended to be called from the verify fun of pkix_path_validation/3 .

    Available options:

        {update_crl, fun()}:
            The fun has the following type specification:

         fun(#'DistributionPoint'{}, #'CertificateList'{}) ->
                #'CertificateList'{}

            The fun uses the information in the distribution point to access the latest possible version of the CRL. If this fun is not specified, Public Key uses the default implementation:

         fun(_DP, CRL) -> CRL end

        {issuer_fun, fun()}:
            The fun has the following type specification:

        fun(#'DistributionPoint'{}, #'CertificateList'{},
            {rdnSequence,[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{}]}, term()) ->
        	{ok, #'OTPCertificate'{}, [der_encoded]}

            The fun returns the root certificate and certificate chain that has signed the CRL.

         fun(DP, CRL, Issuer, UserState) -> {ok, RootCert, CertChain}

        {undetermined_details, boolean()}:
            Defaults to false. When revocation status cannot be determined, and this option is set to true, details of why no CRLs where accepted are included in the return value.

pkix_crl_verify(CRL, Cert) -> boolean()

    Types:
        CRL = der_encoded() | #'CertificateList'{}
        Cert = cert()

    Verify that Cert is the CRL signer.

pkix_dist_point(Cert) -> DistPoint

    Types:
        Cert = cert()
        DistPoint = #'DistributionPoint'{}

    Creates a distribution point for CRLs issued by the same issuer as Cert. Can be used as input to pkix_crls_validate/3

pkix_dist_points(Cert) -> DistPoints

    Types:
        Cert = cert()
        DistPoints = [#'DistributionPoint'{}]

    Extracts distribution points from the certificates extensions.

pkix_hash_type(HashOid :: oid()) ->
                  DigestType ::
                      md5 | crypto:sha1() | crypto:sha2()

    Translates OID to Erlang digest type

pkix_match_dist_point(CRL, DistPoint) -> boolean()

    Types:
        CRL = der_encoded() | #'CertificateList'{}
        DistPoint = #'DistributionPoint'{}

    Checks whether the given distribution point matches the Issuing Distribution Point of the CRL, as described in RFC 5280. If the CRL doesn't have an Issuing Distribution Point extension, the distribution point always matches.

pkix_ocsp_validate(Cert, IssuerCert, OcspRespDer, NonceExt,
                   Options) ->
                      ok | {error, {bad_cert, Reason}}

    Types:
        Cert = IssuerCert = cert()
        OcspRespDer = der_encoded()
        NonceExt = undefined | binary()
        Options =
            [{is_trusted_responder_fun, fun((combined_cert()) -> boolean)}]
        Reason = bad_cert_reason()

    Perform OCSP response validation according to RFC 6960. Returns 'ok' when OCSP response is successfully validated and {error, {bad_cert, Reason}} otherwise.

    Available options:

        {is_trusted_responder_fun, fun()}:
            The fun has the following type specification:

         fun(#cert{}) ->
        	  boolean()

            The fun returns the true if certificate in the argument is trusted. If this fun is not specified, Public Key uses the default implementation:

         fun(_) -> false end

pkix_sign(Cert, Key) -> Der

    Types:
        Cert = #'OTPTBSCertificate'{}
        Key = private_key()
        Der = der_encoded()

    Signs an 'OTPTBSCertificate'. Returns the corresponding DER-encoded certificate.

pkix_sign_types(AlgorithmId) -> {DigestType, SignatureType}

    Types:
        AlgorithmId = oid()
        DigestType = crypto:rsa_digest_type() | none
        SignatureType = rsa | dsa | ecdsa | eddsa

    Translates signature algorithm OID to Erlang digest and signature types.

    The AlgorithmId is the signature OID from a certificate or a certificate revocation list.

pkix_test_data(ChainConf) -> TestConf

    Types:
        ChainConf =
            #{server_chain := chain_opts(), client_chain := chain_opts()} |
            chain_opts()
        TestConf = test_config() | [conf_opt()]

    Creates certificate configuration(s) consisting of certificate and its private key plus CA certificate bundle, for a client and a server, intended to facilitate automated testing of applications using X509-certificates, often through SSL/TLS. The test data can be used when you have control over both the client and the server in a test scenario.

    When this function is called with a map containing client and server chain specifications; it generates both a client and a server certificate chain where the cacerts returned for the server contains the root cert the server should trust and the intermediate certificates the server should present to connecting clients. The root cert the server should trust is the one used as root of the client certificate chain. Vice versa applies to the cacerts returned for the client. The root cert(s) can either be pre-generated with pkix_test_root_cert/2 , or if options are specified; it is (they are) generated.

    When this function is called with a list of certificate options; it generates a configuration with just one node certificate where cacerts contains the root cert and the intermediate certs that should be presented to a peer. In this case the same root cert must be used for all peers. This is useful in for example an Erlang distributed cluster where any node, towards another node, acts either as a server or as a client depending on who connects to whom. The generated certificate contains a subject altname, which is not needed in a client certificate, but makes the certificate useful for both roles.

    Explanation of the options used to customize certificates in the generated chains:

        {digest, digest_type()}:
            Hash algorithm to be used for signing the certificate together with the key option. Defaults to sha that is sha1.

        {key, key_params() | private_key()}:
            Parameters to be used to call public_key:generate_key/1, to generate a key, or an existing key. Defaults to generating an ECDSA key. Note this could fail if Erlang/OTP is compiled with a very old cryptolib.

        {validity, {From::erlang:timestamp(), To::erlang:timestamp()}} :
            The validity period of the certificate.

        {extensions, [#'Extension'{}]}:
            Extensions to include in the certificate.

            Default extensions included in CA certificates if not otherwise specified are:

        [#'Extension'{extnID = ?'id-ce-keyUsage',
                      extnValue = [keyCertSign, cRLSign],
                      critical = false},
        #'Extension'{extnID = ?'id-ce-basicConstraints',
                     extnValue = #'BasicConstraints'{cA = true},
                     critical = true}]

            Default extensions included in the server peer cert if not otherwise specified are:

        [#'Extension'{extnID = ?'id-ce-keyUsage',
                      extnValue = [digitalSignature, keyAgreement],
                      critical = false},
        #'Extension'{extnID = ?'id-ce-subjectAltName',
                     extnValue = [{dNSName, Hostname}],
                     critical = false}]

            Hostname is the result of calling net_adm:localhost() in the Erlang node where this function is called.

        Note:
    Note that the generated certificates and keys does not provide a formally correct PKIX-trust-chain and they cannot be used to achieve real security. This function is provided for testing purposes only.

pkix_test_root_cert(Name, Options) -> RootCert

    Types:
        Name = string()
        Options = [cert_opt()]
        RootCert = test_root_cert()

    Generates a root certificate that can be used in multiple calls to pkix_test_data/1 when you want the same root certificate for several generated certificates.

pkix_subject_id(Cert) -> ID

    Types:
        Cert = cert()
        ID = cert_id()

    Returns the X509 certificate subject id.

pkix_verify(Cert, Key) -> boolean()

    Types:
        Cert = der_cert()
        Key = public_key()

    Verifies PKIX x.509 certificate signature.

pkix_verify_hostname(Cert, ReferenceIDs) -> boolean()
pkix_verify_hostname(Cert, ReferenceIDs, Options) -> boolean()

    Types:
        Cert = cert()
        ReferenceIDs = referenceIDs()
        Options = [{match_fun | fail_callback | fqdn_fun, function()}]

    This function checks that the Presented Identifier (e.g hostname) in a peer certificate is in agreement with at least one of the Reference Identifier that the client expects to be connected to. The function is intended to be added as an extra client check of the peer certificate when performing public_key:pkix_path_validation/3

    See RFC 6125 for detailed information about hostname verification. The User's Guide and code examples describes this function more detailed.

    The option funs are described here:

        match_fun:

        fun(ReferenceId::ReferenceId() | FQDN::string(),
            PresentedId::{dNSName,string()} | {uniformResourceIdentifier,string() |
                         {iPAddress,list(byte())} | {OtherId::atom()|oid(),term()}})

        fun(....) -> true;   % My special case
           (_, _) -> default % all others falls back to the inherit tests
        end

        See pkix_verify_hostname_match_fun/1 for a function that takes a protocol name as argument and returns a fun/2 suitable for this option and Re-defining the match operation in the User's Guide for an example.

            Note:
        Reference Id values given as binaries will be converted to strings, and ip references may be given in string format that is "10.0.1.1" or "1234::5678:9012" as well as on the format inet:ip_address()

        fail_callback:
            If a matching fails, there could be circumstances when the certificate should be accepted anyway. Think for example of a web browser where you choose to accept an outdated certificate. This option enables implementation of such an exception but for hostnames. This fun/1 is called when no ReferenceID matches. The return value of the fun (a boolean()) decides the outcome. If true the the certificate is accepted otherwise it is rejected. See "Pinning" a Certificate in the User's Guide.

        fqdn_fun:
            This option augments the host name extraction from URIs and other Reference IDs. It could for example be a very special URI that is not standardised. The fun takes a Reference ID as argument and returns one of:

            *   the hostname

            *   the atom default: the default host name extract function will be used

            *   the atom undefined: a host name could not be extracted. The pkix_verify_hostname/3 will return false.

        For an example, see Hostname extraction in the User's Guide.

pkix_verify_hostname_match_fun(Protocol) -> Result

    Types:
        Protocol = https
        Result = function()

    The return value of calling this function is intended to be used in the match_fun option in pkix_verify_hostname/3.

    The returned fun augments the verify hostname matching according to the specific rules for the protocol in the argument.

        Note:
    Currently supported https fun will allow wildcard certificate matching as specified by the HTTP standard. Note that for instance LDAP have a different set of wildcard matching rules. If you do not want to allow wildcard certificates (recommended from a security perspective) or otherwise customize the hostname match the default match function used by ssl application will be sufficient.

sign(Msg, DigestType, Key) -> Signature
sign(Msg, DigestType, Key, Options) -> Signature

    Types:
        Msg = binary() | {digest, binary()}
        DigestType = digest_type()
        Key = private_key()
        Options = crypto:pk_sign_verify_opts() | custom_key_opts()
        Signature = binary()

    Creates a digital signature.

    The Msg is either the binary "plain text" data to be signed or it is the hashed value of "plain text", that is, the digest. The key, can besides a standard key, be a map specifing a key algorithm and a fun that should handle the signing. This may be used for customized signing with for instance hardware security modules (HSM) or trusted platform modules (TPM).

verify(Msg, DigestType, Signature, Key) -> boolean()
verify(Msg, DigestType, Signature, Key, Options) -> boolean()

    Types:
        Msg = binary() | {digest, binary()}
        DigestType = digest_type()
        Signature = binary()
        Key = public_key()
        Options = crypto:pk_sign_verify_opts()

    Verifies a digital signature.

    The Msg is either the binary "plain text" data or it is the hashed value of "plain text", that is, the digest.

short_name_hash(Name) -> string()

    Types:
        Name = issuer_name()

    Generates a short hash of an issuer name. The hash is returned as a string containing eight hexadecimal digits.

    The return value of this function is the same as the result of the commands openssl crl -hash and openssl x509 -issuer_hash, when passed the issuer name of a CRL or a certificate, respectively. This hash is used by the c_rehash tool to maintain a directory of symlinks to CRL files, in order to facilitate looking up a CRL by its issuer name.